27 ideas
| 15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
| 15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
| 13095 | Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz] |
| 15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
| 15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
| 15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
| 15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
| 4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
| 2584 | Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block] |
| 2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
| 2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
| 2576 | In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block] |
| 2575 | Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block] |
| 2583 | You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block] |
| 2578 | Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block] |
| 2585 | Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block] |
| 2586 | In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block] |
| 2579 | Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block] |
| 2577 | Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block] |
| 2580 | A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block] |
| 2581 | Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block] |
| 15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
| 15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
| 15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
| 15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
| 2117 | The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz] |